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ABSTRACT
This paper compares the outcomes of several basic types of allocation
systems which are commonly employed in developing countries and centrally
planned economies to distribute certain goods among individuals.

The

allocation systems (to distribute the limited supply of a deficit good)
that we compare are:

convertible and non-convertible rations, the queue

system with and without secondary trade, the bundling of goods (in which
the deficit good is bundled with some other good), and non-intervention
(that is, the unhindered market).

Our analysis focusses on obtaining

positive results: for each pair of allocation systems, we attempt to
ascertain whether a specific group of individuals (particularly the rich
and the poor) is better-off under one allocation system or another.

The

resulting insights and conclusions are valid and_informative, regardless
of the social criterion (or political reasons) based on which a government
might choose an allocation system.
Among the results we obtain are that, for the poor, the ranking of al
location systems (from better to worse) is:

convertible rations, non

convertible rations, the queue system without secondary trade, and non
intervention.

The queue system, thus, does not turn out to be relatively

as beneficial to the poor as it is often thought to be.

The bundling

system _is shown to be inferior for the poor than either convertible or
non-convertible rations.

The rich are found to be better-off under non

intervention than under most other allocation systems.

Also, contrary to

the common belief, we show that a rationing system with convertibility is
not weakly Pareto superior to the one without convertibility. These and
other results are notably robust not only to many of the parameters of the
economy, but also to certain types of commodity taxes (and subsidies) and
administrative costs.

QUEUES, RATIONS AND MARKET:
COMPARISONS OF OUTCOMES FOR THE POOR AND THE RICH
Raaj Kumar Sah*

Governments in less developed countries and centrally planned econo
mies employ a variety of 'non-market' systems to allocate certain goods
among individuals. Among the most common systems are the rationing and the
queue systems.
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Also, there are differences in how a particular system

functions; in some rationing and queue systems, the rationed good is not
convertible (that is, individuals can not exchange this good in secondary
markets) whereas it is partly or fully convertible in others.

Such dif

ferences, as we shall see, have important economic implications.
Each of the above allocation systems leads to a markedly different
distribution of welfare among various individuals in the economy, and
these welfare distributions are quite different, in turn, from the one
that would emerge if the government ~ere not intervening.

The primary

objective of this paper is to compare the welfare of specific groups of
individuals (particularly the poor and the rich) when the limited supply
of a good (the deficit good) is allocated through alter~ative allocation
systems, including non-interventio n.

We do this in two steps:

(i) we

ascertain the utilities of various groups of individuals under each of a
number of allocation systems, and then (ii) we take each pair of alloca
tion systems and attempt to determine whether a specific group of
individuals is better-off under one allocation system or another.
This analysis is strictly positive and, therefore, the results and
1
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insights we obtain are valid and informative, regardless _of the social
criterion (or political reasons such as the unwillingness to allow an in
crease in the market price) based on which a government might choose an
allocation system.

Furthermore, our comparisons of individuals' welfare,

particularly of the poor, under alternative allocation systems are central
to typical policy debates.

For instance, a main argument often given in

favor of the queue or the ration system is that (since direct income sub
sidies to the poor are not feasible) these allocation systems might be
effective ways of helping the poor.

Our analysis helps to recognize some

of the circumstances when such arguments are useful.

We should stress,

however, that it is not the objective of this paper to analyze the socie
tal desirability of alternative allocation systems; such an analysis
must necessarily be based on some normative criterion.
The allocation systems which we compare are:

non-intervention, con

vertible and non-convertible rations, and the queue system with and
without secondary trade.

2

Another allocation system that we examine is

the bundling system (in which the deficit good is bundled with some other
good).

We use relatively simple model_s to depict each of these allocation

systems.

Among the results we obtain are the following.

(i) For the poor, the ranking of allocation systems (from better !.Q.
~ ) is:

convertible rations, ™-convertible rations, the gueue system

without secondary trade, and !!QP.-intervention.

The queue system, thus,

does not turn out to be relatively as beneficial to the poor as it is
often thought to be.

Also, governments frequently attempt to enforce non

convertibility of rations.
poor.

Such an emphasis is potentially harmful to the
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( ii) The rich ~ better-off under .!!-.Q.!!.-intervention than they ~

under rations (convertible .2.!. fil?_!!-convertible) .2.!. the gueue system (with
.2.!. without secondary trade).

Also, the rich .!tf£. better-off under convert

ible rations .2.!. the gueue system with secondacy trade than they~ under
the gueue system without secondary trade.

These results, as we shall see,

are understandable consequences of the high wages and large endowments
that the rich typically have.
It is often believed that no one can be worse-off, and some

(iii)

individuals would be better-off, under convertible rations than under non
convertible rations, because there are gains to trade in the former sys
tem.
~

We show this view to be incorrect; that is:

Convertible rations

not weakly Pareto superior !.Q. fil?_!!-convertible rations.

The reason

behind this counter-intuitive result is that the convertibility of rations
influences individuals' endowments by affecting their incentives to buy
the deficit good from ration shops and, therefore, the standard gains to
trade arguments do not apply here.
(iv)

Secondary trade in a queue system can generate additional

employment opportunities for the poor because, under this system, they are
the ones who typically stand in queues, not only for themselves but also
for others.

This has sometimes prompted suggestions that the poor are

better-off in a queue system with secondary trade than in the one without
it.

We show that such a view is not always correct because, though the

poor might get a higher wage when there is secondary trade, they also may
face a higher opportunity price for the deficit good.
(v)

The poor.!.!£. better-off under either convertible .2.!. .!!-.Q.!!.

convertible rations than they.!.!£_ under the bundling system, if the income
elasticities of the deficit and the bundled goods.!.!£. constant and close
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to

™

goods.

another, and if there is secondary trade in at least one of the ·two
Under the

~

conditions, the rich

.!.!'£_

better-off under

™-intervention than they.!.!'£. under the bundling system.
A methodological aspect of this paper is that the standard tools of
marginal analysis are not usable here because alternative allocation
systems result in equilibria which can not be assumed to be in the neigh
borhood of one another.

Yet, as we shall see, our results are robust not

only to many of the parameters of the economy but also to certain types of
commodity taxes and administrative costs.

Moreover, an obvious strength

of our pairwise comparisons among alternative systems is that the compari
son between any two systems does not depend on whether some other system
is considered feasible or not.

For instance, non-intervention may not be

a realistic alternative in certain contexts; particularly, in centrally
planned economies.

In these contexts, the relevant comparisons are those

which we conduct among alternative government managed systems (that is,
among ration, queue, and bundling systems).
The comparison of outcomes of alternative allocation systems has not
received as much attention in the literature as it deserves.

A central

contribution is that by Weitzman (1977) in which he com.pared, based on a
specific social criterion, the allocation of a fixed quantity of the
deficit good through non-convertible rations versus a 'price system.•
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The present paper differs from Weitzman's in not only the scope (we com
pare many important allocation systems in addition to the two that he
does) and the emphasis (ours is on obtaining positive results, whereas his
is on normative analysis based on a specific social criterion), but also
in the underlying model of the 'price system.'

The last point concerns

the fact that there are profits in the economy if the market clearing
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price of the deficit good is higher than its unit cost.

The distribution

of these profits among individuals, no matter what it is, affects not only
the welfare and the consumption of individuals but also the market clear
ing price.

Though Weitzman notes the critical role that the distribution

of these profits plays in determining the outcome of the 'price system,'
his model assumes that the profits disappear altogether.

In our analysis,

we take into account the distribution of profits; for instance, under
non-intervention, the profits accrue to individuals in proportion to their
ownership of the firms which own the deficit good.
This paper is not related to the important literature which has
extended parts of the theory of second-best and the theory of optimal
commodity taxation to instruments such as rations and queues.

For

instance, Bucovetsky (1984) shows that, starting from a second-best
situation, a government can do better under certain circumstances if a
queue system (without secondary trade) is partly introduced into an
economy.

Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) show that the same is possible if

non-convertible rations are partly introduced into an economy.
lying economic reason

is simple:

The under

the government can not do worse by

having additional policy instruments (whatever the instruments might be,
provided it is assumed that there are no administrative costs) and, under
some circumstances, it may do strictly better, regardless of what the
criterion might be (for example, whether the government wants an improve
ment in the Pareto sense, or whether it wants an increase in some social
welfare function).

This literature also addresses the issue of optimal

rations and queues, given a social welfare function. 4
The present paper has a different aim.

Our motivation here is not to

study rations or queues as additional policy instruments through which the
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government can·do better, based on some criterion.

Instead, our motiva-

tion is to examine rations, queues and other mechanisms as alternative
allocation systems to distribute the limited supply of a good.
our focus is on comparative analysis.

Further,

Therefore, we are not interested in

showing that a combination of two policy instruments can do better than
any one of them. Instead, we specify a number of basic types of allocation
systems, none of which is a special case of another system under consider
ation, and compare their outcomes on specific groups of individuals. 5
It is perhaps useful to point out another difference between our com
parative approach and that based on the theory of second-best.

In the

latter, the administrative costs of policy instruments are ignored (though
these costs are important in practice); in part, because of the diffi
culties in formulating generalizable relationships between the administra
tive cost and the nature of a policy instrument. Specifically, the second
best type results mentioned above, that the government can potentially do
better by employing additional instruments, are based on an assumption
that additional instruments do not entail any administrative costs. The
comparisons undertaken in the present paper, on the other hand, are based
on an assumption that different allocation systems under consideration
entail approximately the same administrative cost (that is, the adminis
trative cost of an allocation system depends on the quantity of the
deficit good distributed).

Furthermore, we show that many of our results

can be extended to those cases where administrative costs of alternative
systems are different.

Thus, though the present analysis also abstracts

from an explicit modelling of administrative costs, our treatment of these
.
d as as t ep 1n
. th e r1g
· h t d"1rec t·1 0n. 6
cos t scan b e v1ewe
In Section I, we derive the expressions for individuals' utilities
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under four alternative systems (non-intervention, convertible and non
convertible rations, and the queue system without secondary trade).

The

method for comparing an individual's utility is summarized in Section II.
The four systems described above are then compared to one another in
Section III. Section IV contains extensions and generalizations; spe
cifically we (i) examine two other allocation systems (the queue system
with secondary trade and the bundling system), (ii) describe the exten
sions or modifications of our results when commodity taxes and administra
tive costs are taken into account, and (iii) point out certain assumptions
one might have to make in attempting to use our positive analysis as a
basis for societal (normative) comparisons among alternative systems.
Concluding remarks are presented at the end.

I.

INDIVIDUALS' UTILITIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION SYSTEMS

Each allocation system implies a different combination of income and
opportunity prices that an individual faces and, thus, a different level
of utility that he (she) has.

In this section, we derive expressions for

the utility levels of different individuals under four allocation sys
tems:

non-intervention (market), non-convertible rations, convertible

rations, and the queue system without secondary trade.
I= M, R, C and

respectively denoted by
superscript

h ,

the economy.

n

h

and

>0

n
,

h

and

Q.

These systems are

Individuals are denoted by

is the proportion of individuals of type
~h = 1.

h

A summation sign without index

means, throughout the paper, that the sum is being taken over all
Denote the available supply (per capita) of the deficit good by

h.
X,

in
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and its unit cost by

p.

The deficit good is a normal consumpti on

good; that is, an individua l's demand for this good is increasing in his
income, and decreasin g in the price he faces.

Also, individua ls' tastes

are sufficien tly similar (though a homogenei ty of tastes is not required
for much of our analysis) . so that the demand for the deficit good (at any
given price) is larger for a person with higher income. For individua l
h
and Vh respectiv ely denote the demand function for the deficit
h • X
good, and the indirect utility function; these functions are defined
over the opportuni ty prices this person faces and his full income.

We

assume that the market demand for the deficit good would exceed the
available quantity if its market price was to be set equal to its unit
cost.

-where

That is

h

m

is the full income (value of endowment) of individua l

the market price of the deficit good is

h

if

p .7

Under non-inter vention, therefore , private firms (owners of the defi
cit good) adjust the consumer price of the deficit good to equate its
demand and supply.

Under a governmen t managed system (that is, under

allocatio n systems

R •

C.

and

Q;

and the systems to be considere d

later). the governmen t procures the available quantity of the deficit good
at its unit cost
tion system. 8

p •

and distribut es it through one or another alloca-

We assume at present that the price of the deficit good

that the governmen t charges at its shops is

p

(of course, the opportun

ity price of the deficit good would be different under different allocation systems, as we shall see below).

That is, there is no commodity tax
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(or subsidy) on the deficit good and, correspondingly , there is no public
surplus (or deficit) under the •!location systems under consideration.
Issues concerning commodity taxes and administrative costs are discussed
later.
For individual

h,

let

X

hI

and

VhI

denote the quantity of the

deficit good consumed, and the utility obtained, under the allocation
system

I.

The economy-wide consumption of the deficit good equals its

available quantity under the allocation system

We now obtain the expressions for

yhI

I ; that is

for various systems, which are

needed for later comparisons.
Non-Interventio n:
of firms)

The individual

h

owns (through partial ownership

units of the deficit good.

a~

Naturally,

If the market clearing price is
of individual

and

x

hM

=

h

is

hM

h

x (p , m

mh + ah(pM - p)X.

hM
+ a (p

p)X) •

by substituting the expression for

X

p

M

h

2.

0 ,

and

then the full income

Thus

The market price
hM

a

p

M

is obtained

into (2); that is, from

We restrict our analysis to those situations where the aggregate demand
curve for the deficit good is downward sloping in its price. 9

The rele

vant implication of this restriction, in combination with (1) and the
above expression for determining

p

M

is that the market price

p

M
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is higher than

p.

This implicat ion is consiste nt with the intuitio n

that systems such as rationin g are typicall y employed in those situatio ns
where the market allocati on would entail a signific ant rise in the price
of the deficit good.
Non-con vertible Rations:

In this case, individu als can buy (at gov

ernment shops) up to a fixed quantity of the deficit g·ood, but no more,
and resale is not permitte d.
system, and

XR

The supersc ript

R denotes this allocati on

denotes the maximum quantity of ration.

populati on self selects itself into two groups.

Naturall y, the

The first group consists

of those who wish to buy the deficit good in quantiti es smaller than or
equal to
them,

x

XR
hR

These individu als are not constrai ned by rationin g.
h

h
_R
= x (p, m)
ix--,

For

and

The second group consists of those who want to consume more deficit
good than

t',

but are constrai ned to consume only

XR.

A convenie nt

represen tation of an individu al's utility under a rationin g constrai nt is
as follows [see Neary and Roberts (1980) for details] .
price of the deficit good for person
from:

X

h( p hR ,

mh

+ ( p hR - p )XR)

h

= XR •

to be

p

hR

•

Define the shadow
which is obtained

Then, this person's consump tion

behavio r under rationin g is the same as that in the hypothe tical case when
he faces price

p

hR

faces no rationin g.
expresse d as

•

receives an income transfer

(p

hR

_R.

- p):x--.

Therefo re, the utility level of person

h

and
can be
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where

p

hR

10

>p

The maximum ration quantity is obtained from

where the first summation is over those individua ls who are not constrained by rationing (group
who are (group

L ),

and the second summation is over those

U ).

We assume that there are at least some individua ls (the poorest per
sons are among them) who do not (or can not) buy the maximum ration
quantity

XR.

This, we believe, is a more accurate represent ation in

most situation s (particul arly in developing countries ) than to assume that
everyone buys the maximum ration quantity.

t'

(7)

>X

From (6), therefore

•

Convertib le Rations:

If rations purchased from the governmen t shops

can be subsequen tly traded, and if the resulting equilibriu m price of the
deficit good is higher than
tity of available ration.

p ,

then everyone would buy the full quan

The ration per person is thus

X •

denotes the equilibriu m price, then the full income of person
h
C
m + (p - p)X, and his utility level is

C

hC

h

C

h

If

h

C

p

C

is

The price

p

into (2).

Compariso n of (8) with (3) shows, as one might expect, that the

is obtained by substituti ng

x

= x (p, m

+ (p

- p)X)

key differenc e between non-inter vention and convertib le rations is that,in
the latter system, the governmen t interventi on has equalized the virtual
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Since the income distribution in these two

ownership of the deficit good.
cases is different,
pc> p.

p

C

and

p

M

are not the same, in general.

But

given our earlier restriction that the aggregate demand curve

is downward sloping in price.
Qµeues without Secondary Trade:

In this case, consumers wait in
The waiting time is assumed to be

queues to purchase the deficit good.

proportional to the quantity purchased.

This representation approximates

those cases where individuals make several purchases in small lots within
a single decision period; for instance, because private storage of the
deficit good is expensive.

If the waiting time per unit purchase is

then the opportunity price of the deficit good is
utility level of the individual

The waiting time per unit,

t,

h

p + tw

h

t,

Thus, the

is

is determined from

xhQ = xh(p + twh, mh)

and (2).
We assume that the prices of the non-deficit goods (that. is, of goods
other than the deficit good) and the wage of any given individual are not
significantly different under the four allocation systems described above.
What it means is that jf the economy were to switch (hypothetically) from
non-convertible rations to convertible rations (for the deficit good), for
instance, then the induced adjustments in the aggregate demands and
supplies of the non-deficit goods and of different types of labor are such
that the market price of these goods and labor types are not significantly
affected.

This would be the outcome if, for example, the supply elastici

ties of the non-deficit goods and the demand elasticities for different
types of labor are large.
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II.

METHOD FOR COMPARING AN INDIVIDUAL'S UTILITY

The method to compare the utilities of specific individuals under
alternative allocation systems is summarized in this section.
ally, if

I

and

J

represent two different allocation systems, then we

want to ascertain whether the individual
under

I;

that is whether

yhI

h

is better-off or worse-off

is larger or smaller than

some cases, such a comparison is straightforward.
let

p

hI

hI
m

and

hJ
m

h ,

hI

<

_p

I

.

denote the respective variables under the system

hJ

•

In

For notational brevity,

under the system

individual is better-off under the system
p

VhJ.

denote the price of the deficit good and the income,

corresponding to the individual
and

Specific

I

if:

with at least one strict inequality.

p

Let
J

> hJ
mhI _m

.

hJ

Then the

and

This is because a

higher income or a lower price (or both) yield a higher utility.
To deal with the remaining cases, in which one of the two allocation
systems entails a higher price but also a higher income for an individual,
define the following metric

=

(10)

where we recall that
the individual

(11)

h

( mhI -mhJ) + ( p hJ - p hI) x hJ

X

hJ

is the quantity of the deficit good consumed by

under the system

if

h
A (I, J)

2.

J.

Then it can be shown that

0 •

A derivation for (11) is provided in Appendix 1, but it can also be estab
lished through the following revealed preference argument.

If

Ah> 0,

then (10) implies that this individual could have purchased, in allocation
system

I,

the same bundle of goods as he did in the allocation system

14

J.

The individual's actual purchase under the allocation system

however, was different.
under

Therefore, the individual

h

I.

must be better-off

I.

Note that this method does not yield a verdict when the metric (10) is
negative or when its sign is unclear, but it is the best available method
for comparing an individual's utility under two different situations,
without imposing restrictions on his preferences.

In the analysis below,

therefore, we compare.!_! many pairs of allocation systems l l

~

possible

based on the above general method.

III.

COMPARISONS AMONG ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION SYSTEMS

In this section, we compare the outcomes of the allocation systems
described in Section I.

We do this first for the poor, then for the rich.

In addition, we point out certain important aspects of the comparison
between convertible and non-convertible rations.
Comparisons for the Poor:

The poor are denoted by

h

=

1 •

Since the

poor belong to the lower tail of the distribution of incomes and wages,
their demand for the deficit good is relatively low.

In particular, we

expect a poor person's demand for the deficit good under non-convertible
rations to be smaller than the per capita available quantity.

(12)

X

lR

<X

That is

•

No special assumption is needed for the poor to behave this way; the
budget constraint itself will generate such a demand behavior at suffi
ciently low incomes.

Next, we assume that the poor do not get any part of

the profit under non-intervention; this is a reasonable assumption be-
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cause the poor do not typically possess ownership of firms.
a

1

=

0,

That is,

and from (3)

The last assumption, as will become clear below, is relevant only for the
comparison of non-intervention with other systems.
following result:

We now derive the

The ranking of allocation systems for the poor (from

better to worse) is convertible rations, non-convertible rations, the
queue system without secondary trade, and non-intervention.
Begin by comparing convertible rations to non-convertible rations.
Expressions (4), (8) and (10) yield

Using (12) and recalling that

p

C ) p ,

it follows that (14) is positive.

Therefore, the poor are better-off under the ration system with converti
bility than they are if rations are non-convertible.
is as follows.

The reason for this

Convertibility of rations brings an income gain to the

poor, but it also entails a higher price for the deficit good.

On

the

whole, the poor are better-off with convertibility because the (income
producing) ration quantity they can get under this system exceeds the
quantity of the deficit good they consume under non-convertible rations.
Next, the comparison between non-convertible rations and the queue
system without secondary trade is straightforward since, from (4) and (9),
the poor have the same income under these two systems, but they face a
higher price of the deficit good under the latter.

This is because the

queue system entails a n ~ cost of waiting, small though this extra
cost may be for the poor.

Thus,

v1 R > v1 Q.

Finally, compare (13)and

16

(9).

The poor have the same income under the queue system and non-

intervention, but the respective prices for the deficit good are
and

p

M

Now recall that

PM ) p •

p + tw

1

It follows then that a person with

sufficiently low wage is better-off under the queue system than under
non-intervention.
Comparisons for the Rich:

The rich are denoted by

h = r.

and they

belong to the upper tail of the distribution of incomes and wages.

As one

would expect, the comparisons between non-intervention and other systems
depend, in part, on the ownership of the deficit good that the rich have
under non-intervention.

We show here that:

The rich are better-off under

non-intervention than under other allocation systems (that is, under con
vertible or non-convertible rations, or under the queue system without
secondary trade), if their ownership of the deficit good under non
intervention is large; specifically if
(15)

arX

2. xrI •

for

I= R, C and

Q.

That is, if the ric·h own more deficit good under non-intervention than

what they consume under other systems.
The condition (15) is automatically satisfied in a two-class economy
because, in this case, the rich own all of the deficit good under non
intervention, but (regardless of the allocation system) the poor consume
at least some of the deficit good.
This, in the two-class case, implies
. 1 1es
.
Furth er, ( 2 ) 1mp

a

r

= 1/nr

xrI __ (X _ nl.lI)/nr
~

along with the fact that

1
x I ) 0,

~huh
Lil

To see this, recall that
,

because

a

1

=

-- 1 •

0 •

The last two expressions,

yield (15).

In fact, we expect the

condition (15) to be satisfied even in a multi-class economy, because the
rich typically own proportions of firms' shares which are far in excess of

17

the proportions of the outputs (of firms) that they consume.
To confirm that the rich are better-off under non-interventio n than
under other systems (when (15) holds), we obtain the following from (3),
. 11
(5), (8), (9) and (10).

(16)

r
R
Ar (M, R) = (pM -p)(aX-X)

(17)

Ar (M, C) = (pc - p)(x rC

(18)

Ar (M, Q) = (pM - p)(a r X - x rQ ) + tWr XrQ

Recall that

p

M

non-negative.

>p

•

-

X) + (p

M

r
- p)(a X _ xrC)

Using (15), thus, (16) and (18) are

and

Also, the rich have more than the (economy-wide) average

income under convertible rations.
than average; that is

xrC

> X.

Therefore, their consumption is more
Hence, (17) is positive.

We can also show that those with very high wages (which includes the
rich) are better-off under convertible rations than under the queue system
without secondary trade.

Specifically, expressions (8), (9) and (10)

yield

(19)

- p) ]x

Since

p

C

>p

•

hQ

the above expression is positive if

Convertible versus Non-convertible Rations:

•

h
w

l

Cp

C

- p)/t.

Often it is thought that

a rationing system with convertibility must be weakly Pareto superior to
the one without convertibility; after all, it could be argued that the
gains from trade can not harm anyone and should help at least some indivi
duals.

Such an argument overlooks the fact that the convertibility of

rations can alter individuals' endowments and, therefore, the gains to
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trade argument can not always be applied.

In fact, we show that:

Con

vertible rations are not weakly Pareto superior to non-convertible
rations; that is, certain individuals are better-off under non
convertible rations.
In particular, consider individuals whose consumption of the deficit
good under convertible rations is between
XR

2. xhC 2. X.

X and

XR;

that is:

Among these individuals, there could be two types:

those

whose consumption is not constrained under non-convertible rations, and

those whose consumption is constrained.

First take up the former type;

for them, expressions (4), (8) and (10) yield

Next, take up those whose consumption is constrained under the nonconvertible ration system.

For them, expressions (5), (8) and (10) yield

Both (20) and (21) are non-negative because

p

C

>p

,

and

p

hR

>p

•

Thus, this entire group of individuals is better-off under non-convertible
rations than under convertible rations.
The intuition behind this result can be seen in two steps.

First,

under convertible rations, everyone has an incentive to buy the maximum
quantity of rations available; consequently, this quantity equals

X.

Under non-convertible rations, there is no such incentive and, further,
there are individuals who do not buy the maximum ration quantity;
correspondingly , the maximum ration quantity,

XR,

is larger than

X.

Second, recall that the convertibility of rations implies a higher price
of the deficit good, but also an income gain

(p

C

-

p)X •

Thus, for those

1
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individuals whose consumption under convertible rations is larger than
but smaller than

XR.

X

the loss due to higher price exceeds the income

gain from convertibil ity.12
It should be emphasized that the above result is based on our
assumption that some individuals in the economy (the poorest are among
them) do not (or can not) buy the maximum ration quantity under the
non-convert ible ration system.

This assumption, as argued earlier, is

more realistic than to assume that everybody buys the maximum quantity
under the non-convert ible ration system. 13

IV.

EXTENSIONS

In this section, we first examine two other allocation systems (the
queue system with secondary trade, and the bundling system), and briefly
compare them to some of the systems discussed in the preceding sections.
Next, we describe extensions or modification s of our results when commod
ity taxes and administrati ve costs are taken into account.

Finally, we

point out certain assumptions one might have to make in using our positive
analysis as a basis for normative comparisons of alternative systems.
Queues with Secondary Trade:

In the queue system examined earlier, an

individual must himself stand in the queue to be able to consume the defi
cit good.

In some developing countries' cases, it is observed that

individuals hire others (or use domestic help) to stand in queues.

A

polar representati on of this type of queue system is the one in which
there is secondary trade in the deficit good; in which case, standing in
queues becomes a separate economic activity undertaken by only those with
the lowest wage.

Consequentl y, the opportunity price of the deficit good
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is the same for all individuals ; unlike in the queue system without
secondary trade where the opportunity price is higher for those with
higher wages.

Clearly, therefore:

Those with very high wages (which

includes the rich) are better-off under the queue system with secondary
trade than under the one without secondary trade.
Also, introduction of secondary trade in a queue system may raise the
wage of the group of workers with the lowest wage, because now there is
additional demand for their labor. 14

This effect has sometimes prompted

suggestions that the introduction of secondary trade in a queue system is
helpful to the poor.

This view may not, however, be correct under certain

conditions; the reason for this can be qualitativel y understood as
follows.

One of the possible consequence s of introducing secondary trade

in a queue system is that the waiting time per unit of the deficit good
increases to balance the demand and the available supply of the deficit
good.

In this case, the poor face not only a higher wage but also a

higher opportunity price of the deficit good.

If the increase in their

wage is sufficiently small (for instance, if the elasticity of their labor
supply with respect to the wage is sufficiently large) then the poor would
be better-off under a queue system without secondary trade than in the one
with secondary trade.
Bundling of the Deficit Good:

One of the allocation systems which has

sometimes been employed in developing countries entails bundling of
goods; for instance, the quantity of the deficit good that an individual
can buy from a government shop is proportiona l to the quantity of some
other good (the 'bundled good') he buys.

To understand some of the conse

quences of such a system, we begin with the case in which there is
secondary trade in both goods.

Let

(p, q)

denote the unit prices of the
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deficit and the bundled good at governmen t shops, and let

b

denote the

units of the deficit-go od which an individua l can buy when he buys a unit
of t he bundl ed good at t hese sops.
h

If

(P B, qB)

are the equilibriu m

prices for the respectiv e goods at which individua ls exchange them, then
the absence of arbitrage requires

Therefore , the utility level of the individua l

If

X

~

and

z

~

B

and

b

can be represente d as

respectiv ely denote the quantitie s of the deficit and

the bundled good consumed by the individua l
p

h

h

under this system, then

are obtained from

An intuitive property of the above system is that the consequen ce of

bundling is the same whether secondary trade is possible in both the
deficit and the bundled goods, or whether secondary trade is possible in
only one of the two goods.

This is because tradabili ty of either of the

two goods, or of both, leads to exactly the same relationsh ip between the
opportuni ty prices of the two goods.

Specifica lly, if only the deficit

good can be traded and if its exchange price is
ity price of the bundled good is given by

q

B

p

B

•

in (22).

then the opportun
Similarly , if

only the bundled good can be traded and if its exchange price is
then the opportuni ty price of the deficit good is

p

B

B

q

•

given by (22).

To compare the outcome (for the poor) of the bundling system to that
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of non-con vertible rations, we obtain the followin g expressi on from (4),
·
15
(10) and (23).

It is obvious that the sign of the above expressi on can be determin ed only
for certain types of individu als' demand behavio r.

We consider here the

case in which the income elastici ties of the demand for the deficit and
the bundled goods are constant and equal.
come elastici ty, then
and

k

2

If

~

denotes the common in-

and

where

are positive numbers which depend on prices.

these expressi ons into (24) yields
(25) equals zero.

Therefo re,

k

= k 2b • Thus,

1

Substitu tion of
x

hB

= bz hB

,

and

v1R) v1B.

Combinin g this conclusi on with an earlier result (that converti ble
rations are better for the poor than non-con vertible rations) , it follows
that:

The poor are better-o ff under either non-con vertible or converti ble

rations than they are under the bundling system.
tained, by comparin g (3) to (23), that:

It can also be ascer

The rich are better-o ff under

non-inte rvention than they are under the bundling system~ provided the
conditio n (15) is satisfie d for

I= B

Commodity Taxes and Subsidie s:

We have abstract ed in this paper from

issues concerni ng commodi ty taxation .

This is not because we view commod-

ity taxes to be playing an unimpor tant role (particu larly in developi ng
countrie s) but because many aspects of such taxes are relative ly well
understo od in the literatu re, whereas the question s examined in this paper
have not received adequate attentio n.

An importan t generali zation of the

analysis presente d earlier is, however, notewort hy.

Specific ally, our

results remain unchange d if there is a tax (or subsidy) on the deficit
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good, provided the same tax exists under all allocation systems.
To see'this, let

s

denote the tax per unit of the deficit good.

(i) the price of the deficit good at government shops is

That is:

under the ration, queue, or bundling system; (ii) under non

p + s,

intervention,

s

is the difference between the equilibrium price of the

16
·
h' goo d receive;
·
.
. . goo d an d t h e price
tis
wh'ic h f'irms owning
d e f icit
(iii) the resulting budget surplus (or deficit) to the government, in each
sX

case, is

per capita.

Then. it can be verified that our comparisons

among the alternative allocation systems are unaffected, regardless of
what

is; this is because

s

s

cancels out when an individual's util-

ity under alternative systems is compared.
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In the more general case

where commodity taxes differ under different allocation systems (leading
to different government surpluses or deficits). it is obvious that the
comparisons among systems would combine the implications of the allocative
properties of alternative systems as well as those of differential tax
policies.
Administrative Costs:

It can be ascertained that our results are

unchanged if alternative allocation systems entail the same administrative
cost (that is, personnel, storage and similar other costs depend only on
the total quantity of the deficit good), and if this cost is passed on to
the consumers through the price of the deficit good.

This is because the

effect of administrative cost, in this case, is analogous to that of a tax
on the deficit good.
Additional generalizations of the following kind are, therefore, also
possible:

Suppose we find that

hI
V

V> ~hl

when systems

I

and

J

have

the same administrative cost, then the same conclusion holds even if the
system

J

has a higher administrative cost than that of

I.

To see a
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specific example, recall the result that convertible rations are better
for the poor than non-convertible rations.

Though this result was

obtained in the context without administrative costs, it holds not only
when the two allocation systems entail the same administrative cost, but
also when the administrative cost of non-convertible rations is larger
(for instance, if the cost of enforcing non-convertibility exceeds the
cost of transacting secondary trade).

An explicit modelling of adminis

trative costs is, however, not attempted in this paper (or in much of the
literature), because there appears to be an inadequate conceptual or
empirical basis, at present, to formalize generalizable relationships
between the administrative cost and the detailed nature of an allocation
system.
Normative Comparisons:

It is possible, in principle, to use our posi-

tive analysis as a basis for conducting societal comparisons of alterna
tive allocation systems, given any normative criterion.

For instance, if

the social comparisons were to be based on a Bergson-Samuelson welfare
function, then such an analysis would require a calculation of the value
of the social welfare function under each system, and a comparison of
these values across systems.

In practice, however, such comparisons face

limitations.
Specifically, the standard tools of marginal analysis are not usable
in comparing alternative systems because the resulting equilibria are not
in the neighborhood of one another.

Therefore, to conduct normative com

parisons across systems, one would need to posit specific functional forms
for the social welfare function as well as for individuals' utility
functions. Even then, analytical comparisons may not always be possible;
for example, because of the discontinuity in the non-convertible ration
system.

18

Social comparisons, thus, may require considerably more
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detailed assumptions concerning the parameters of the economy than what we
.
19
f ound to b e necessary f or our pos1. t.1ve compar1sons.

V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Allocation systems such as rationing and queues are extensively em
ployed in many developing countries and centrally planned economies.

In

this paper, we have compared the consequences of several basic types of
such systems with one another, and with that of unhindered market (non
intervention).

Our analysis has concentrated on positive comparisons:

we

have attempted to ascertain, for each pair of allocation systems, whether
a specific group of individuals (particularly the poor and the rich) is
better-off under one system or another.

The results and insights obtained

from these comparisons are valid and informative, regardless of the social
criterion or political reasons based on which a government might choose an
allocation system.
We recognize that there is a great diversity in the structures and the
economic outcomes of the allocation systems that are employed in different
contexts.

In this paper, we have used relatively simple models to depict

alternative allocation systems and have focussed on the comparisons of
their outcomes within an important class of circumstances when the supply
of a good is limited.

Within this class, our results are robust not only

to parameters such as the quantity of the deficit good available in the
economy, and its unit cost, but also to certain types of commodity taxes
and administrative costs.

Moreover, the results concerning the compari

sons among various government managed systems (that is, among rationing,
queues, and the bundling system) hold even when the quantity of the
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deficit good to be distributed among individuals is a policy choice,
rather than a datum for the economy.

The corresponding comparison between

a government managed system and non-intervention would, of course, be
affected by the nature of supply response; the present paper has not
analyzed this important case.
Also. for both the queue and the ration system, we have considered two
polar specifications:

one in which there is no secondary trade and the

other in which there is full secondary trade.

In some countries, inter

mediate cases are observed in which partial secondary trade is conducted
in underground markets, in contravention of the formal law. In such cases,
different individuals participate in these underground markets to various
degrees depending, in part, on their incomes and risk-aversion, on the
difference between the prices at the government shops and in the under
ground markets, and on the nature of the legal enforcement system.

We

hope that comparisons of the outcomes of these and other specifications of
alternative allocation systems would be undertaken in the future research
work.
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FOCYI'NOTES
*I thank Martin Weitzman for comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.
1.

These systems have been employed (and have been a source of important
controversie s) in developed countries as well, particularly during
external hostilities and embargoes.

2.

Intermediate cases of rationing and queues in which the deficit good
is partially convertible in underground markets are briefly discussed
at the end of the paper.

3.

The social criterion used is as follows.

An ideal distribution of the

consumption of the deficit good is posited and, then. the social loss
under an allocation system is defined to be the sum (over the indivi
duals) of the square of the deviation of the actual distribution of
consumption (under the system) from the ideal distribution .

The two

allocation systems are then compared on the basis of the respective
social losses.

Rivera-Bati z (1981) extends this analysis by adding a

cubic term to the definition of the social loss.
4.

Specifically , Bucovetsky (1984) derives the optimal (multi-perso n
Ramsey-like) rule when the government uses queues. in addition to com
modity taxes.

Younes (1984) derives the optimal rule when the addi

tional instrument is rationing.

Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) contrast

the commodity structure of optimal rations and taxes.
5.

There are many economic reasons (such as the unavailabil ity of infor
mation, and the limitations on third-party enforceabil ity) why only
simple allocation systems. such as those considered in this paper, are
typically feasible.

Specifically , we do not consider mechanisms such
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as nonlinear pricing schemes (with arbitrary nonlinearities) , because
such schemes are never feasible for consumption goods.

For a discus-

sion of some of these economic reasons in the context of taxation in
developing countries, see Sah and Stiglitz (1985).

6.

The present paper is also unrelated to the work of Kornai and others
[see Kornai (1980), Kornai and Martos (1981), and Hare (1982)] which
addresses issues such as control, communication and the endogeneity of
shortages in models of centrally planned economies.

To the extent

this work addresses the effects of non-price allocation systems on
consumers, its emphasis is on describing these effects for specific
allocation systems rather than on comparing the consequences of alternative systems.
7.

The expression (1) captures the notion that there is a 'shortage' of
the deficit good at the 'desired' price level.

In fact, it is under

these conditions that governments typically intervene by employing
allocation systems such as rations or queues.

Also, unless explicitly

needed, we suppress some of the arguments of the demand function and
the indirect utility function; in particular, the prices of
non-deficit goods, and the individual's wage rate are suppressed.
8.

In those contexts where non-interventio n is not a feasible alternative
(for instance, when the deficit good is produced in the public
sector),

p

is the unit cost to the government.
denotes the price derivative of the aggregate deb

h

m + a (p
D
p

<0

M

- p)X) ,

regardless of how

a's

then we are assuming that

are distributed among individuals.

What this assumption means, in more elementary terms, can be seen as
follows.

First, note that

D

P

=

pih (xPh

h h
+ a Xx ) ,
m

where
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x

h
m

+

h
h
=ax/am
•

Using a Slutsky relationship ,

\..h h h_
Lu xm(a----X - x hM ) ,

hu
xp

where

response of the compensated demand of an individual.

is the price
For brevity,

denote the two terms in the •right hand side of the last expression as
and

Clearly,

Dpl

<0

,

since

<0

xhu
p

from a standard

property of the compensated demand (we assume that there is some pos
sibility of substitution in an individual's choices).

Thus, our re

striction that

DP

positive, or (ii)
example where

is negative- means that either (i)

DP

DP

DP

2

2

is positive but it is dominated by

10.

Dpl.

An

For this example, it is easy to verify

is automatical ly negative.

D

p

To see that
h

where

µ

son.

Also

p hR

>p

•

note from (5) that

avhR/aXR

=

µh(phR - p)

•

is the (positive) marginal utility of income for this peravhRtaxR

is positive because this person wants to con-

sume more of the deficit good.
11.

is non-

is zero is when individuals have linear Engel

curves with identical slopes.
that

2

Hence,

p

hR

>p

•

Note that in the derivation of (16), the utility level of the rich
under non-convert ible rations is given by (5) because their consump
tion of the deficit good is constrained under this system.

12.

This analysis is based on a different logic than that in Baumol
(1982).

In the latter, salable and non-salable ration points are

examined under the assumption that individuals have envy towards each
others' consumption bundles, and that the social criterion is that of
fairness.
13.

Under the latter assumption, it is easily verified that convertible
rations are weakly Pareto superior to non-convert ible rations.
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14.

For simplici ty, we assume that the same group of individu a.ls remains
at·-the bottom of the wage distribu tion even after an increase in
their wage.

15.

Note that

q

is the market price of the bundled good under alloca

tion systems other than the bundling system.

Also, since the

opportun ity price of the bundled good differs under the two alloca
tion systems presentl y being compared , a slight extensio n of (10) is
required to derive (25.).

Specific ally, if

qr

and

qr

represen t

the opportun ity prices of the bundled good under allocati on systems
and

r

person

h

I

and if

zhJ

is the quantity of this good consumed by

under the system

r,

then the term

(qr - qI)zhJ

is

added to the right side of (10).
16.

The expressi on 'non-int erventio n' is somewhat awkward here, but the
economic meaning should be apparent .

17.

This generali zation assumes that the relation ship (1) is satisfie d at
the consumer price
p + s

p + s ;

that is, the market demand at price

exceeds the supply of the deficit good.

Also, note that if

the price of the deficit good at governme nt shops is very low (due to
a large subsidy) then everyone would buy the maximum ration quantity
under the non-con vertible ration system.

The conseque nce of such a

possibi lity has already been discusse d in the precedin g analysis .
18.

The operatio nal problem in this case is analogou s to the one faced by
Blinder and Rosen (1985) in analyzin g notches (jumps) in social
policy.

Also note that the limitati ons on social comparis ons that

are being pointed out here exist even if the social criterio n is
somethin g other than a Bergson- Samuelso n social welfare function .
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19.

There may be exception s, however.

For instance, if the social com

parisons were to be conducted on the basis of the Rawlsian criterion ,
then the results would be the same as those we have obtained for the
poorest group of individua ls.
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APPENDIX 1
Let

e

h

denote the expenditu re function for person

h;

that is,

mhJ = e h( p hJ , VhJ ) •
Clearly:

~I> VhJ,

if

0h

>·o.

This is because higher

utility costs more at any given prices.

Now using the definitio n of the

expenditu re function, one can reexpress

0h as

Next, among the standard propertie s of an expenditu re function are that it
is concave in prices, and that its derivativ es with respect to prices
equal an individua l's consumpti on quantitie s.

Further, if we assume that

there is some possibili ty of substituti on in the consumpti on choice of an
individua l, then

Substitut ing (27) into (26) and using the definitio n (10), one obtains:

0h

> Ah(I,

0h) 0.

(28)

J)

•

Finally, recall from above that:

It follows then that

if

h
A (I, .T)

2.

0 •

yhI)

yhJ.

if
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